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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-ETHICAL DUTY OF COUN-
SEL WHO BELIEVES CLIENT'S WITNESSES WILL COMMIT
PERJURY. STATE V. MAHONEY, 16 Md. App. 193, 294 A.2d 471
(1972).
John Edward Mahoney was convicted of robbery with a deadly
weapon; the conviction was upheld on appeal.' Subsequently, a
petition for post-conviction relief was filed in which the defendant
alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to
call several alibi witnesses who allegedly would have testified that he
was home at the time the robbery was committed.
During the post-conviction hearing, at which time the defendant and
trial counsel testified, it was revealed that counsel's principal reason for
not calling these witnesses was his belief that they would commit
perjury.2 The post-conviction judge concluded that trial counsel had
been incompetent, and ordered a new trial.3 The State of Maryland
filed an appeal maintaining that: 1) Mahoney's trial counsel acted
properly in not calling the alleged alibi witnesses because the failure or
neglect of trial counsel in not calling witnesses, even if material, is a
matter of trial tactics; 2) if such trial tactics are later proved
improvident, there is still not a denial of effective representation; 3)
there was no showing that this particular fact situation was tantamount
to a denial of effective assistance under the Maryland test for
1. State v. Mahoney, 16 Md. App. 193, 294 A.2d 471 (1972).
2. Illuminating for purposes of the issue under discussion is the verbal exchange between
post-conviction judge and John Bell, trial counsel. Id. at 198-200, 294 A.2d at 473, 474:
[Bell]: ... [T]his presented a difficult situation for the defense attorney or any de-
fense attorney but I think it is abundantly clear that while a defense attorney is
an instrumentality by which the defendant's case is presented to the jury and to
the Court, the defense attorney cannot take the facts of a case and change them
substantially, nor can a defense attorney in any way participate in a fraud upon
the Court or lend himself to any perjury or subornation of perjury from the
defendant or any other witnesses ... and not to bring any fabrication or lies
or any other false, spurious, counterfeit facts before the Court or before the jury.
[Judge]: Are you the judge? Are you supposed to make that judgment as to whether
or not their testimony would be perjured?
Isn't the jury the judge? Isn't the jury entitled to hear the testimony of the de-
fendant's witnesses and then reach its own judgment as to who is telling the
truth and who isn't?
[Bell]: I would take the position that I am not going to put on any witnesses, in-
cluding the defendant, who I think is going to give perjured testimony.
3. The trial court felt the decision by Mahoney's trial counsel not to call the witnesses was
more than a tactical judgment and thus concluded that "Bell's failure to accede to
Mahoney's wish 'to have alibi witnesses testify for him* * * deprived * * * [him] of due
process'; [and] that if Bell 'didn't like the way his client was insisting that the case be
tried, he should have withdrawn his appearance ....... Id. at 200, 294 A.2d at 474.
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determining competency of trial counsel;4 and, 4) the so-called alibi
witnesses would not have assisted Mahoney in his defense, as their
testimony would not have established his whereabouts at the time the
crime was committed.
Mahoney contended that his trial counsel was obligated to present all
evidence available to his defense which was of probative value, unless he
knew that such evidence was perjured, and that whether such witnesses
were to be believed was a matter solely for the jury.' Defendant's legal
conclusion was that he had been denied due process under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals approached the controversy
through the formulation of two issues:
(1) Whether, in the circumstances of this case, Mahoney's
Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of
counsel and to due process of law were denied him by reason of
counsel's refusal to call the so-called alibi witnesses to testify on
his behalf at the trial.
(2) Whether, in the circumstances of this case, viewed in light of
the provisions of Maryland Rule BK45 directing that [the]
post-conviction hearing judge 'make such order on the petition
as justice may require', counsel's refusal to call the alibi
witnesses justifies the granting of a new trial.6
The Court of Special Appeals held that trial counsel's refusal to call
the alibi witnesses, even if an improper exercise of judgment, was not so
prejudicial as to deny the defendant effective assistance of counsel or
due process of law: the defendant's contentions thus did not warrant
granting a new trial. In reaching its decision, the court noted that no
showing was made as to what the testimony of the alibi witnesses
(other than the defendant's mother and sister-in-law) would have been,
that none of the other alleged alibi witnesses were produced at the
post-conviction hearing, and that the proposed testimony of the mother
and sister-in-law would fail to show that the defendant was home at the
time the crime was committed.7
While no fundamental disagreement exists with either the reasoning
used or the conclusion reached by the Mahoney court on the overriding
issue of effective assistance, a more comprehensive treatment would not
have been unwarranted. An examination of authorities in a variety of
jurisdictions provides no scarcity of commentary on the subject. A
preliminary requirement in affording a client effective assistance of
counsel is the obligation of the attorney to investigate all sources of
4. The Maryland test for determining competency of trial counsel is whether, under
all the circumstances of the particular case, counsel was so incompetent that the accused
was not afforded genuine and effective legal representation. Green v. Warden, 3 Md.
App. 266, 269, 238 A.2d 920, 922 (1967).
5. 16 Md. App. at 201, 294 A.2d at 475.
6. Id. at 202, 294 A.2d at 475.
7. Id. at 207, 294 A.2d at 478.
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inquiry suggested by the accused. This is a determinative factor in
whether counsel has acted properly in failing or refusing to call a
witness suggested by his client.8 By general consensus, failure on the
part of counsel (or investigators for counsel) to pursue suggested lines
of examination, will result in a denial of effective assistance. 9 Once this
mandatory pre-trial investigation procedure has been faithfully exe-
cuted, the judicial trend is to give counsel great latitude in the calling of
witnesses. Generally, the decision is regarded as a judgment of strategy
or trial tactics left almost exclusively to counsel.' 0 Even improvi-
dent strategies or poor tactics do not necessarily amount to deficient
advocacy. 1 ' It has also been stated that the failure to call alleged alibi
witnesses, where counsel believes their testimony not to be helpful, is
considered a part of proper trial tactics.1 2 Clearly then, the failure to
call a non-material witness is not a denial of effective assistance. One
court has stated that to sustain a claim of inadequate representation by
reason of failure to call a witness, it must be established that the alleged
defense witness was material, necessary, or admissible, or that defense
counsel did not exercise proper judgment in failing to call him." 3 This
court therefore implies that within "proper judgment" even a material
witness can be withheld, the courts on review defining "proper
judgment." However, other authority, expanding the latitude of
"proper judgment" and thus limiting the courts on review, states that
whatever the reason involved, failure to put on the stand material
witnesses is merely an error of judgment which does not constitute
denial of effective assistance.' '
Though the above analysis clearly supports Mahoney's result, what
should be criticized is the court's failure to have dealt, if only by way
of dicta, with the underlying sensitive and confusing ethical dilemma
8. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 210, 449 P.2d 174, 181, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 245 (1969);
Evans v. Warden, 240 Md. 333, 335-36, 214 A.2d 145, 146 (1965).
9. Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 577
(3d Cir. 1971); People v. Perry, 271 Cal. 2d 84, 111, 76 Cal. Rptr. 725, 743 (1969).
10. Johns v. Warden, 240 Md. 209, 211, 212, 213 A.2d 467, 470 (1965); Shelton v. State, 3
Md. App. 394, 401, 239 A.2d 610, 615 (1968). Mere tactical errors generally will not in-
voke a finding of incompetency. Gullion v. Warden, 3 Md.' App. 263, 266, 239 A.2d.
140, 142 (1968); Hall v. Warden, 224 Md. 662, 665-66, 168 A.2d 373, 375 (1961). Further-
more, where a party is represented by counsel, he is not entitled as a matter of right to
examine witnesses or otherwise participate in the conduct of his trial. Strosnider v.
Warden, 245 Md. 692, 695-96, 226 A.2d 545, 548 (1967).
11. Tompa v. Virginia, 331 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1964); Ingram v. Cox, 321 F. Supp. 90,
92-93 (W.D. Va. 1970); Bray v. Peyton, 290 F. Supp. 593, 594-95 (W.D. Va. 1969);
Terrell v. United States, 294 A.2d 860 (D.C. App. 1972); Bell v. United States, 260 A.2d
690 (D.C. App. 1970).
12. United States v. Dorn, 169 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1959); State v. Crepeault, 127 Vt.
465, 496, 252 A.2d 534, 537 (1969).
13. People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 690-91, 452 P.2d 329, 335, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1969).
14. Tompa v. Virginia, 331 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1964); Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d
460 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Churder v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 207, 209 (E.D. Mo. 1968);
Crowder v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 291, 294 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Hoffler v. Peyton,
207 Va. 302, 311, 149 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1966).
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posed: namely, what is the role of an attorney when, in light of all the
facts at his disposal, he reasonably believes, but does not know for a
certainty, that material or non-material witnesses for his client will
perjure themselves? Although, admittedly, the facts of Mahoney lend
themselves to a strict analysis on the basis of effective assistance of
counsel, the lurking ethical considerations which the court did not
discuss were in fact the motivating forces of the appeal. Moreover, the
ethical problems manifested are representative of the ongoing struggle
and attendant confusion in defining the balance between active zealous
representation on the one hand and faithful duty as an officer of the
court on the other. The case at hand provides an appropriate focus on
the existing problems and guidelines for an attorney facing a similar
ethical problem.
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association is recognized by the bench and bar throughout the United
States as setting forth proper standards of professional conduct.' s
Regrettably, however, the Code adds more uncertainty than it does
guidance to this issue.' 6 The original Canon V of the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics stated that, "A lawyer in
undertaking the defense of one accused of crime is bound by all fair
and honorable means to present every defense that the law of the land
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty,
but by due process of law."' ' Likewise, the current Canon VII of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law. However,
Ethical Consideration 7-26 states:
The law and disciplinary rules prohibit the use of fraudulent,
false, or perjured testimony or evidence. A lawyer who
knowingly participates in the introduction of such evidence is
subject to discipline. A lawyer should, however, present any
admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he
knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that
such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured.'"
The Code and interpretative cases appear to define "knowing" or
"should know" in the sense of absolute certainty. If, in a particular fact
15. The Maryland Rules of Procedure now Irovide that the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility of the American Bar Association (as set forth in Appendix F of the Rules) is
adopted as part of state statutory law. MD. R. Civ. P. 1230.
16. Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An Attorney's
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 28 (1966).
17. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5 (1908). The Canons of Professional Ethics,
adopted in 1908, were added to and amended numerous times until the adoption of
the Current Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics. The
Code was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on
August 12, 1969 to become effective for American Bar Association members on Jan-
uary 1, 1970.
18. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, No. 7, EC 7-26.
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situation, this quantum of conviction has been reached, the attorney's
conduct is clearly defined. Thus, the courts have held an attorney
responsible under the prohibition of EC 7-26 in the following
situations: 1) the witness informs counsel of his intent to commit
perjury;1 9 2) the client tells counsel of his intent to commit perjury;2 0
3) the client or witness commits perjury while on the witness stand;2 1
4) there was reasonable cause to believe the court was being
defrauded.2 2
Absent, however, is specific direction from the Code in stating
proper conduct where reasonable belief but not total certainty exists. It.
would appear therefore, that the job of defining the parameters of EC
7-26, vis-i-vis the issue here, is left to the individual attorney or to the
courts on a case-by-case analysis. Conceivably, any particular court
could include or delete "reasonable belief" from the mandates of EC
7-26. This potentially shifting standard may well be a perplexing
dilemma to an ethically-minded attorney fearing possible later
repercussions, while at the same time providing an invitation to
carelessness for others who fear not the dangerous edge.
Moreover, the problems raised by these vague strata of uncertainty
go beyond the self-protective interests of the attorney involved.
Important considerations of the role of counsel in relation to the client
and the court are also raised. A fundamental belief has existed among
the bar that the proper role for counsel is zealous defense in spite of
personal feelings as to guilt or innocence of the client: to do otherwise,
it is thought, would be "donning the robe of judge and claiming
membership on the jury.",2  On the other end of the spectrum, the
Code and bar demand the utmost obligation as an officer of the court.
This is the classic conflict in the dual role of the advocate. Clearly, the
conflict is resolved in a "knowing" situation under EC 7-26: the duty
to represent zealously by using every possible defense under the law is
preempted by a higher obligation to protect the court from fraud. But
the disturbing question is whether the same order of priorities is
justified under circumstances of reasonable belief. If so, the mandates
of EC 7-26 would, in the present situation, protect the attorney from a
charge of inadequate representation if he decides to withhold
testimonial or real evidence. If not, the attorney potentially faces
condemnation from bench and bar for overreaching his role as counsel
and thus denying the client effective assistance.
19. Ingle v. Fitzharris, 283 F. Supp. 205, 207 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
20. State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970).
21. In re Hoover, 46 Ariz. 24, 46 P.2d 647 (1935); In re Palmieri, 176 App. Div. 58, 162 N.Y.S.
799 (1916); In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d 1095 (1958).
22. In re Huie, 285 Ala. 185, 188-91, 230 So. 2d 514, 517-19 (1970); In re Griffith, 283 Ala.
527. 534, 219 So. 2d 357, 359 (1969). In both of these cases disbarment was warranted
where counsel obtained divorces either knowing or having reasonable cause to believe
that the parties were not bona-fide residents of the state.
23. Gallegos v. Turner, 256 F. Supp. 670, 677 n.6 (D. Utah 1966).
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Although much legal scholarship has been generated in closely
related areas, the specific ethical problem presented in Mahoney
remains a singularly gray area in legal ethics, with most discussion
centering around the situation where the client informs counsel of his
intent to commit perjury. Those writers who constitute the more liberal
divisions of the bar on ethical principles believe that their first loyalty is
to the client.2 4 Members of the bar who constitute the more
conservative side on ethics consider themselves first of all officers of the
court, and tend to adopt a literal interpretation of the canons.2 5 While
there is a consensus among both of these groups that the attorney
should first try to dissuade the perjuriously-inclined client, opinion
differs if this proves unsuccessful. A key spokesman of the "left wing,"
Monroe H. Freedman, argued that a lawyer is obligated to exploit every
means to secure his client's acquittal, and that a declaration by the
defendant that he would perjure himself should not alter that
obligation. Freedman claimed that either withdrawal from the case or
informing the court of the defendant's intended perjury would only
shift the ethical burden to another lawyer or judge. Moreover,
Freedman believed that under the protections and obligations of
confidentiality, the attorney would have no alternative but to put the
perjurious witness on the stand without explicit or implicit disclosure
of the attorney's knowledge to either judge or jury. Freedman would
thus treat the client as innocent until the court finds him guilty, even
when the client has admitted his guilt to the lawyer.
2 6
Approaching the problem from the "right wing" was Mr. Chief
Justice Warren Burger, then a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, who
maintained that the canons are clear in their prohibition against the
knowing use of perjured testimony.2  In dealing with a client who
24. Speaking for this group, Charles P. Curtis of the Boston Bar wrote:
His [the lawyer's] loyalty runs to his client. He has no other master. Not the
Court? you ask.... No, in a paradoxical way. The lawyer's official duty, re-
quired of him indeed by the court, is to devote himself to the client. The court
comes second by the court's, that is the law's, own command.
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951).
25. The attitude of this group seems to be that the final goal of justice cannot be attained by
stooping to condone or collaborate in those practices which are endemic to the injustices
above which men of the law aspire to rise.
Championing this view has been Lloyd P. Stryker who wrote:
The standards of conduct that lawyers must obey are as high, and are as gen-
erally followed, as the most exalted rules that govern any men on earth. All advo-
cates are bound by these standards, and they must obey them. They may and
should fight hard for their clients, but they must fight fairly. They may and should
say all that honestly and honorably can be said for them. They may say it with
fervor and all the persuasion in their power; but in saying it they may not deceive,
they must not lie.
L. STRYKER THE ART OF ADVOCAcY 283 (1954).
26. Reichstein, The Criminal Law Practitioner's Dilemma: What should the lawyer do when
his client intends to testify falsely? 61 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 1, 2 (1970), citing Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1469, 1471, 1475-76, 1477-78, 1482 (1966).
27. The Chief Justice stated: "The proposition that perjury may ever be knowingly used is as
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informs counsel of his intent to commit perjury, Chief Justice Burger
does not state that a lawyer must inform the court of the intended
perjury, but he does place severe restrictions on the attorney's
subsequent conduct. In stating that the lawyer inay not facilitate the
perjury in any way, he has set forth explicit guidelines.2 8
The written material that has addressed itself more closely to the
specific issue of reasonable belief reflects this same conflict among the
legal community as to the dual client-court obligation. One writer in
the early part of the century expounded the belief that it is the jury's
role to determine the veracity of witnesses. While agreeing that counsel
is precluded from the introduction of evidence known to be false, the
matter of determining the veracity of witnesses was said to be otherwise
out of his hands.2 9
A more contemporary viewpoint consistent with this approach
directs attention to the exact problem of conscience. This commentator
notes that attorneys, although attempting to be objective, cannot help
but form moral judgments as to the guilt or innocence of clients.
Realizing this, he urges that counsel should resist to the utmost the
tendency of this mental and emotional formulation to influence their
handling of the case. 3" Responding to the claim among the bar that the
pernicious as the idea that counterfeit documents can be fabricated and knowingly of-
fered to the Court as genuine. This is so utterly absurd that one wonders why the subject
need even be discussed among persons trained in the law." Burger, Standards of Con-
duct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q.
11, 12 (1966). See also, Bress, Standards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense
Function: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 AM CRIM. L. Q. 23 (1966); Bress, Professional
Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1495 (1966); and Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confi-
dentiality, 64, MICH. L. REV. 1488 (1966).
28. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's View-
point, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 11, 13 (1966), says:
In those circumstances, if the lawyer's immediate withdrawal from the case is
either not feasible, or if the Judge refuses to permit withdrawal, the lawyer's
course is clear: He may not engage in direct examination of his client to facilitate
the known perjury. He should confine himself to asking the witness to identify him-
self and to make a statement, but he cannot participate in the fraud by conven-
tional direct examination.
See also Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases: A Response, 55 GEo. L. J., 1048, 1053 (1967):
Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REV. 575, 594-95 (1961).
29. Battle, The Defense of a Client Whose Guilt is Known, 4 N.Y.L. REV. 74, 75 (1926).
The author states:
[I]t frequently happens that testimony is offered which the counsel may suspect
to be untrue, but which he does not know to be false. In such event it is his
duty ... to present this testimony and leave it to the jury to determine its truth
or falsity. The counsel has no right as such to pass upon the veracity of wit-
nesses. If a witness makes statements and is prepared to testify to them under
oath, counsel is not justified in withholding such testimony because he may sus-
pect it is not true .... But if the witness tells him the testimony is true, then it
is his duty to submit that testimony to the jury.
30. Gold, Split Loyalty: An Ethical Problem for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 14 CLEV.-
MAR. L. R. 65 (1965):
Belief in a client's cause should not be so overwhelming that the lawyer's enthu-
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jury, and not counsel, should pass on the veracity of a client's story, a
past president of the American Bar Association has taken the opposing
stance, assuming a strong court-oriented position. 3 ' He believed it is
the duty of counsel to know whether his client is guilty in a criminal
case, and that he should govern his advice and conduct of the case
accordingly.3 2
While the ambiguities of the code of ethics and the disharmony
among legal scholars pose more questions than answers to the problem,
fortunately, some direction has been emanating from the courts.
Although there are no authorities directly holding that "reasonable
belief" of perjury falls within the prohibition against the knowing use
of perjured evidence, a number of cases have directed their analysis
toward that principle.
One classification of case authority has protected defense counsel's
efforts at preventing the introduction of potentially perjured evidence.
In a recent California decision, petitioner claimed denial of effective
assistance for counsel's failure to investigate allegedly exculpatory
defense witnesses. The court found no denial of effective assistance
where the information given to the attorney regarding the proposed
witnesses was given under such circumstances that counsel reasonably
believed the testimony would be perjured . 3 ' Another California court
concluded that counsel's failure to call witnesses on behalf of his client
was justified on two grounds, one of which was that after weighing all
of the facts, the attorney may well have believed the proposed
testimony of the witnesses to be false. Supporting this position, the
court noted that an attorney owes no duty on behalf of his client to
offer testimony which is untrue.3 " Cases have also held counsel's
siasm creates witnesses or should [his] disbelief.., discourage possible
witnesses from testifying for a defendant.
... Disbelief and defeatism deny the defendant the right to effective counsel.
Id. at 72-73.
31. Buckner, The Trial of Cases, 15 A.B.A.J. 271 (1929) states:
The client is not entitled to have a lawyer who will permit a witness or client
to testify to something which the lawyer himself does not believe to be true....
... I think that if the lawyer thinks that his client or witness is not telling the
truth he should not be a party to what he believes to be perjury.
Id. at 273.
32. "The lawyer should form an opinion as to his guilt or innocence in order that he may probe
more intelligently into the truth or falsity of the testimony which the client or his friends
propose to give in court and thus prevent the introduction by himself of false testi-
mony." Id. at 273.
33. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 202, 211-13, 449 P.2d 174, 182-83, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240,
246-47 (1969). Here, information was given to counsel just prior to sentencing. Under
these circumstances, "reasonable belief" was sufficient to abort the otherwise manda-
tory requirement to investigate all crucial defenses of fact that may be available. While
stating the general maxims of EC 7-26, the court appears to have expanded in this situa-
tion the concept of "knowing."
34. People v. Lucas, 1 Cal. App. 3d 637, 642-44, 81 Cal. Rptr. 840, 844 (1969). The second
and primary ground justifying the decision not to call the witnesses was that counsel
19731
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disbelief in the veracity of alleged exculpatory witnesses, following an
investigation, was sufficient ground for deciding not to call them at
trial.' Finally, one recent decision has recognized a measure of
responsibility to the court where the attorney reasonably suspects that
the client's representations are false.3 6
Another classification of authority, addressing itself to the govern-
ment's obligation in the presentation of evidence, has recognized a level
of responsibility below absolute knowledge of perjured testimony: the
United States District Court for Maryland has twice spoken to this
point. In one case, counsel for petitioner argued that in order to obtain
relief, petitioner need not show that the prosecuting officer had actual
knowledge that 'the testimony was perjured; it was sufficient that the
officer should have known. The court recognized the more severe
requirement, but decided it was not necessary to pass on that legal
point.3  In the other case, the District Court held that petitioner's
allegations that the prosecuting attorney should have known that
certain testimony was perjured raised factual issues and legal questions
concerning the state's responsibility for the accuracy of what the
witness said.3 8 Other jurisdictions have also recognized this princi-
ple,3 and even civil cases have carved a niche of responsibility where
may have determined legally it made little difference what the witnesses would have
testified to. Somewhat parallel to Mahoney, the court raised the ethical considerations,
but ultimately decided the case according to proper trial tactics.
35. United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 305 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The decision
not to call alibi witnesses was not considered ineffective assistance of counsel where one
of the reasons for the decision was an investigator's report to counsel that he did not
believe the witnesses.
See also In re Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d 408, 415-18, 310 P.2d 15, 20-21, cert. denied, 335
U. S. 899 (1957). Here, both the attorney and sheriff had investigated the witnesses,
the attorney concluding they were not, as claimed, present when the crime took place.
The court concluded that counsel's failures to call the two allegedly exculpatory wit-
nesses because he felt they would perjure themselves, was not a denial of effective as-
sistance of counsel. It is interesting that the lower court judge in this case made essentially
the same recommendation to counsel as the post-conviction judge did in Mahoney.
The referee believed the testimony of the public defender but concluded
that... [he] should have presented a defense which... [he] believed was
false and let petitioner gamble on the chances that the jury might impose a death
sentence or a life sentence for murder, or might convict petitioner of a lesser of-
fense than murder, or might acquit petitioner.
Id. at 417-18, 310 P.2d at 21.
36. State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 16, 270 A.2d 284, 289 (1970). The New Jersey
court, in agreeing that an attorney must seek for his client his maximum entitlement
under the law and not to act as judge or jury, also noted: "It is not an attorney's re-
sponsibility to decide the truth or falsity of a client's representations unless he has
actual knowledge or unless from facts within his personal knowledge or professional
experience he should know or reasonably suspect that the client's representations are
false." Id.
37. The district court noted that "even if the less severe burden applies, this petitioner has
not proved any such injury as would bring the rule into play." Smith v. Warden, 254 F.
Supp. 805, 806 (D. Md. 1966).
38. McCloskey v. Boslow, 349 F.2d 119, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1965).
39. Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951). Here the court recognized the principle
by stating: "In the case before us there is no suggestion that the prosecuting officers
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an attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a fraud was perpetrated
on the court.4 0 Although the above authority does not directly
advocate that "reasonable belief" of perjury be put squarely within the
prohibitions against the knowing use of perjured testimony, it
represents at least a foundation for the proposition.
Against the above conflicts and scattering of existing guidelines,
Mahoney's significance becomes apparent not merely because it exposes
the vague area under consideration: factually, this case is a classic
example of the problem. The attorney, after making the required
investigation of those available witnesses suggested by his client, and
evaluating all surrounding facts, concluded that it was the apparent
intention of the relatives to establish some type of false alibi. He
therefore decided that he could not in good conscience present any
witnesses whom he considered were intent on proffering perjured
testimony. This decision was not reached arbitrarily-several factors
were taken into consideration independent of counsel's investigation of
the witnesses themselves:
(1) at the trial, a juvenile accomplice of the defendant testified
in detail that he, together with John Mahoney and brother Will
Mahoney, committed the robbery;
(2) a second witness testified that shortly after the robbery, the
defendant came to his home and admitted the robbery--subse-
quently offering money to the witness to supply him with an
alibi;
(3) a third witness, Mahoney's uncle, told the jury that the
defendant admitted to him he had committed the robbery;
(4) both John and Will Mahoney made full confessions to the
police shortly after their arrest; and
(5) an admission was made to counsel by defendant's brother,
Will Mahoney, that the defendant had committed the crime.4
Consequently, the defendant offered no evidence in his defense, and
the jury found him guilty of armed robbery.
Counsel's conduct is open to two interpretations which, in
themselves, mirror the general dilemma. On the one hand, Mahoney is a
case of an attorney motivated by the highest ethical ideals in protecting
knew or had reason to believe that any of the testimony offered at the trial of the
petitioner was false or perjured." Id. at 410.
Another case, citing Wild, declared that a due process violation had occurred be-
cause the District Attorney should have known of a plea-bargain agreement. The court
noted that even if the District Attorney did not know of the agreement, he had every
reason to believe a deal had been made and should have made further inquiry. DeLuzio
v. People, 494 P.2d 589, 592 (Colo. 1972).
40. Where attorneys obtained divorces when they had reasonable cause to believe that one
or both of the parties was not a bona fide resident of the governing state, disbarment
was held warranted. In re Huie, 285 Ala. 185, 188-91, 230 So. 2d 514, 517-19 (1970);
In re Griffith, 283 Ala. 527, 534, 219 So. 2d 357, 363 (1969).
41. 16 Md. App. at 195, 196, 294 A.2d at 472.
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the court from even the possibility of fraud, while on the other, either
an attorney diluting his client's case by usurping the jury's role in
determining the veracity of potential witnesses, or an attorney whose
services were rendered ineffective because of his own conviction of his
client's guilt. Arguably, the five factors pointing to the client's guilt
played a more significant role in counsel's belief of perjury than the
independent investigation of the witnesses themselves. Assuming this
belief of perjury was more client-oriented than witness-oriented, an
argument can be advanced that counsel was rendered ineffective once
convinced of his client's guilt. To state the proposition another way,
because counsel believed in his client's guilt, a fortiori, the witnesses
must be lying.4 2 The Maryland court was not, by virtue of the facts of
the case, forced to elect one of these positions. Because Mahoney dealt
with non-material witnesses, a convenient escape valve was provided.
The court resolved the case squarely within the sphere of proper trial
tactics, thus achieving a polite sidestepping of the ethical consideration
involved.
Left in limbo at this point is how the court would resolve a similar
situation where the witnesses are critical to the defense. It is notable
that authority exists for the proposition that even a material witness
can be withheld, whatever the reason, once the required pre-trial
investigation is made.4 " If the Maryland courts followed this line of
42. Although factually distinguishable from Mahoney, Johns v. Smyth, i76 F. Supp. 949,
953 (E.D. Va. 1959); and State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 563, 271 A.2d 752, 761
(1970), provide the underlying theory of this argument. In Johns the attorney repre-
sented an indigent state prisoner convicted of murder. Counsel failed to submit in-
structions covering manslaughter and failed to argue the case to the jury, even though the
evidence provided by the prosecution suggested some provocation for the act. In exploring
the reasons for the attorney's failure to pursue these tactics, the court stated: "[Y]ou
could not conscientiously argue to the jury that he [the defendant] should be ac-
quitted?" The attorney responded: "I definitely could not." Johns v. Smyth, supra at
953. The court held that the failure of counsel for a defendant "to argue the case before the
jury, while ordinarily only a trial tactic not subject to review, enters the field of incompe-
tency of counsel when the reason... [given for such failure to argue].., is the
attorney's conscience." Id. Thus, the defendant was denied due process because he was
not provided with effective assistance of counsel. The court in stating its reasons said:
When the defendant was interviewed by his court-appointed attorney, the at-
torney stated that he had reason to doubt the accuracy of the defendant's state-
ment. It was at this time that the attorney's conscience actuated his future conduct
which continued throughout the trial. If this was the evidence presented by the
prosecution, the defendant was entitled to the faithful and devoted services of
his attorney uninhibited by the dictating conscience.
Id., citing Johns, Merchant stated:
[P]etitioner's counsel in prejudging their client's guilt failed as a consequence to
pursue the defense of consent or to make an investigation into the reputation of the
prosecutrix and.., their belief in the improbability if not impossibility of a white
housewife consenting to intercourse with a negro laborer ... is the equivalent of
the attorney's "conscience" in Johns and thus removes.., counsel's conduct of
the defense from the realm of trial tactics and places it in the category of ineffective
representation.
State v. Merchant, supra at 563, 271 A.2d at 761.
43. In Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the court stated with regard
to the failure of counsel to call an alleged alibi witness: "Whatever the reason for it, the
Recent Developments
reasoning, even a material-witness situation with parallel ethical
problems could again be resolved according to proper trial tactics
disregarding any ethical considerations. Thus, the "trial tactics"
principle, if followed, would safeguard an attorney who decided for
ethical reasons to withhold a material witness. The question remains,
however, whether on review, the Maryland courts (unlike the above
authorities) would delve into counsel's reasons for failing to introduce a
material defense witness. If so, it would remain uncertain whether the
court would be satisfied if the sole reason for the attorney's decision
was an ethical consideration of the type under discussion. In addition,
because Maryland has neither approved nor disapproved a "reasonable
belief" standard, an attorney faced with a decision either to proffer or
to withhold evidence which he reasonably believes will be perjured
would only be guessing whether his conduct will receive acceptance or
condemnation. The ethical struggles raised in Mahoney are a prelude to
these unresolved problems.
CONCLUSION
The often antagonistic roles of zealous advocate and dutiful officer
present significant tensions for the criminal defense lawyer. Even if it is
true, as has been suggested,4  that most attorneys today agree that the
ultimate responsibility of counsel is to the court, the difficulty would
lie in determining at what point the superior loyalty to the bench
should come into play to the potential compromise of the client's
interests. The resolution of this ethical dilemma recommended by the
post-conviction judge, that counsel withdraw from the case, merely
postpones the inevitable, for each succeeding individual will be faced
with the same difficulty.4  It is suggested that counsel's motives in
Mahoney were admirable and exemplify the highest principles in the
practice of law; however, whether one applauds or criticizes counsel's
actions, whether one agrees or disagrees with a "reasonable belief"
measure of responsibility, and whether one perceives a subtle expansion
of EC 7-26 emanating from the courts, one fact is apparent: the need
for judicial guidance. If the courts reserve to themselves the right to be
decision was for the judgment of counsel and should not now be the basis for a charge of
inefficiency. Thus, there is no merit to this position of petitioner's claim." Id. at 461.
In addition, with regard to the failure to call witnesses, one court has said: "the failure
to produce and put on the stand material witnesses is merely an error of judgment which
does not constitute lack of effective representation of counsel." Hoffler v. Peyton, 207
Va. 302, 311, 149 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1966). See also cases cited note 14 supra.
44. Stovall, Aspects of the Advocate's Dual Responsibility, 22 ALA. LAW. 66, 68 (1961).
45. Brief for appellant at 7, State v. Mahoney, 16 Md. App. 193, 294 A.2d 471 (1972).
See also Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1469, 1476 (1966).
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the final arbiters of professional conduct for members of the bar in
Maryland, then it is the courts who must actively seek to aid lawyers in
defining proper ethical conduct where the code or case law has been
vague or silent. Failure to do so leaves at best no guidelines for those
concerned practitioners faced with a similar ethical situation, and, at
worst, a temptation for others to exceed proper bounds of professional
conduct. State v. Mahoney represented an opportunity lost for such
guidance.
Richard S. Miller
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-AUTOMOBILE
SEARCH ON POLICE LOT HELD VALID DUE TO EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES. SKINNER V. STATE, 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d
828 (1972).
In Skinner v. State,' the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
upheld a conviction for receipt of stolen goods and possession of heroin
and controlled paraphernalia.2 The defendant was discovered in an
attempt to cash a stolen check at a bank, and thereafter fled to a
waiting car. A description of the defendant and the car was reported to
the police, who relayed it to a patrol unit, which in turn stopped the
defendant's car in an apartment parking lot.
After locking his car, the suspect was taken to the police station, and
his car was towed to headquarters where officers secured a warrant
authorizing its search. In dealing with the constitutionality of the
search of the car in the police garage, the Skinner court stated:
The search is constitutionally unassailable. With scrupulous
regard for their suspect's 4th Amendment protections, the
[police] did more than they were required to do. Their effort,
in terms of its constitutionality, is like Portia's quality of
mercy, "twice blest."
.... [A]t the moment when [one of the officers] saw the
[defendant's] automobile pull onto the parking lot ... he...
had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained
fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime. We are further
satisfied that the exigency of the situation would have justified
an immediate warrantless search of the automobile there upon
that parking lot.
3
1. 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d 828 (1972).
2. This note will not deal with the exception to a search warrant due to a bona fide inventory
search. A jury verdict of statutory common nuisance, also not dealt with in this note, was
reversed. Skinner v. State, 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d 828 (1972).
3. 16 Md. App. at 118-19, 293 A.2d at 830-31 (1972).
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